Evidence

  • Japan was ready to quit anyway. More than 60 of its cities had been destroyed by conventional bombing, the islands were being blockaded by the American Navy, and the Soviet Union entered the war by attacking Japanese troops in Manchuria.
  • America did not want to modify its "unconditional surrender" allowed the Japanese to keep their emperor.
  • A demonstration explosion over Tokyo harbor would have convinced Japan's leaders to quit without killing many people.
  • Even if Hiroshima was necessary, the U.S. did not give enough time for the word to spread of its devastation before bombing Nagasaki.
  • The bomb was used partly to justify the $2 billion spent on its development.
  • The two cities were of limited military value. There were five or six civilians to one soldier.
  • Japanese lives were sacrificed simply for America to show its power against the Soviet Union.
  • Conventional firebombing would have caused as much significant damage without making the U.S. the first nation to use nuclear bomb.

Rubble was all that was left after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 5, 1945

A pall of smoke lingers over this scene of destruction in Hiroshima, Japan, on Aug. 7, 1945, a day after the explosion of the atomic bomb.


A few steel and concrete buildings and bridges are still intact in Hiroshima after the Japanese city was hit by an atomic bomb by the U.S., during World War II


Navy Leaders

In his memoirs Admiral William D. Leahy, the President's Chief of Staff--and the top official who presided over meetings of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff--minced few words:

  • "The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. . . . "
  • "In being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children."
 On June 18, 1945, almost a month before the Emperor's July intervention to seek an end to the war and seven weeks before the atomic bomb was used,Leahy recorded in his diary:
  • "It is my opinion at the present time that a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provisions for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression."
The Under-Secretary of the Navy, Ralph Bard, formally dissented from the Interim Committee's recommendation to use the bomb against a city without warning. In a June 27, 1945 memorandum Bard declared:
  • "Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling. "
  • "During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for. "
  • "I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program. The stakes are so tremendous that it is my opinion very real consideration should be given to some plan of this kind. I do not believe under present circumstances existing that there is anyone in the country whose evaluation of the chances of the success of such a program is worth a great deal. The only way to find out is to try it out."
Air Force Leaders
The commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, gave a strong indication of his views in a public statement only eleven days after Hiroshima was attacked. Asked on August 17 by a New York Times reporter whether the atomic bomb caused Japan to surrender, Arnold said:

  • "The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air.
In his 1949 memories  Arnold observed that "it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse."

Arnold's deputy, Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, summed up his understanding this way in an internal military history interview:

Arnold's view was that it was unnecessary. He said that he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military's job to question it.
Eaker reported that Arnold told him:

  • "When the question comes up of whether we use the atomic bomb or not, my view is that the Air Force will not oppose the use of the bomb, and they will deliver it effectively if the Commander in Chief decides to use it. But it is not necessary to use it in order to conquer the Japanese without the necessity of a land invasion."

Army Commanders




On the 40th Anniversary of the bombing former President Richard M. Nixon reported that:   
  • "General Douglas MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy that the Bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants. . . . MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off. . . . "


The day after Hiroshima was bombed MacArthur's pilot, Weldon E. Rhoades, noted in his diary:   
  • "General MacArthur definitely is appalled and depressed by this Frankenstein monster [the bomb]. I had a long talk with him today, necessitated by the impending trip to Okinawa. ."


Former President Herbert Hoover met with MacArthur alone for several hours on a tour of the Pacific in early May 1946. His diary states:
  • "I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria."